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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which 
factionalism serves as a surrogate for partisanship in explaining the 
strength of the relationship between ecological variables and roll-call 
votes. The study also examines selected hypotheses on voting behavior 
to analyze the effect of constituency on patterns of legislative 
voting in two state senates during the 1961 and 1965 sessions.
Analysis of intra-party opposition votes in Florida and 
inter-party opposition votes in California reveal that factionalism 
serves the same function as partisanship in explaining the association 
between aggregate territorial data and voting behavior. The factions 
appear to be based on urban-rural cleavages, but not on a sectional 
alignment of the constituencies.
For both states, the correlations between ecological variables 
and roll-call voting are weak. This suggests that either the 
legislators do not use the selected socio-economic characteristics of 
their districts as information guiding their perceptions of constiuency 
attitudes, or that the legislators are not responsive to their 
constituents across the selected issue domains. Confirmation of other 
hypotheses relating constituency characteristics to roll-call voting 
suggests that the ecological variables are in fact insufficient cues 
to legislative voting.
THE ECOLOGICAL BASIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR 
IN TWO STATE SENATES
INTRODUCTION
Legislatures, as political institutions, are essentially 
patterns of behavior by virtue of the specific behavioral uniformi­
ties exhibited by each legislative generation and passed on from it 
to the next.'*' Current study of legislative behavior, instead of 
prescribing norms of behavior from normative assumptions about 
legislatures1 functions, strives to discover, describe, and explain 
observable patterns of behavior which presumably are relevant to 
those functions, for it is only through the accumulation of empiri­
cally verifiable data on patterns of legislative behavior that a body 
of intersubjectively transmissible knowledge of such behavior can be 
acquired. As this knowledge is systematically developed and integrated 
with other elements peculiar to the legislative system, a more accurate 
understanding of the American legislative process becomes realized.
The research presented in this paper intends to employ the behavioral 
approach in its analysis of the influence of specific constituency 
variables on voting behavior in selected competitive and noncompetitive 
state senates. It is hoped that this approach will contribute not 
only to an understanding of the legislative processes involved in the
"^"Political Behavior," International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, Vol. IX (New York: Macmillan Co. and The Free Press,
1968), p. 240.
2
3two selected state senates, but also to a better understanding of the 
legislative system at large.
The study of legislative behavior refers to the analysis of 
the actions and the reciprocal expectations of individuals in the 
legislative system. The term "system” is used here to denote a 
conceptual scheme involving a number of individuals who interact 
within a legislative, environmental framework in order to effectively 
satisfy goal-oriented needs or desires. Thus, David Easton conceptu­
alizes the political system in general as constituted by the multi­
plicity of social interactions involved in the policy-making process 
oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society.' 
It has become increasingly accepted that legislative behavior in the 
legislative system is social behavior in a particular institutional 
context. The research efforts of the past several decades have been 
to conceptualize and explain legislative behavior more fully with 
respect to its effect on legislative functioning and output, and with 
respect to its relationship to more general principles of human 
behavior from psychological and sociological perspectives. Recent 
studies by Patterson in 1958 and Wahlke in 1962 have used this latter 
approach to relate the behavior of legislators to the group life of 
the society, to the role concepts of legislators as individuals, and 
to explain significant aspects of legislative behavior in terms of
2
David Easton, The Political System (New York: A. A. Knopf,
1953), pp. 129-130.
43
role theory. One important dimension of legislative behavior, 
therefore, is the number of different categories of behavior which 
have analytically been found to be involved in legislative role 
concepts and manifested in legislative role behavior. Concomitant 
with this dimension of legislative behavior is the amount and type 
of variation in these respects found empirically to occur between 
patterns found in different legislatures and between members of a 
given legislature.
This research, although acknowledging the important contribu­
tions of role theory, will nevertheless focus on legislative 
functioning and output as products of external influences, for 
example, constituency variables, rather than internal role conceptual­
izations. It is well to bear in mind, however, that both approaches 
are complimentary and are not to be considered alternative explanations 
or descriptions of the American legislative process. Periodic 
reference to role concepts, as applicable to legislative output, will 
be made when deemed appropriate.
3See Samuel Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in 
a State Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly,11 Public Opinion
Quarterly, 23 (1961), 101-109; and John C. Wahlke, et al., The 
Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 237-431.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Underlying the examination of legislative behavior is the 
larger context of representational behavior. Representational 
behavior refers to that aspect of legislative conduct that is studied 
for the nature, extent, and basis of its correspondence with 
constituency opinions. Representatives are assumed to differ in the 
extent to which they reflect their constituents1 opinions in their 
legislative activities, most notably in their decision making. The 
question of the nature of representation is central to nearly all 
studies of the functions of legislatures or the behavior of legisla­
tors, for it is assumed that in democratic political systems, 
legislatures are authoritative and legitimate decision-making institu­
tions on the basis of their representative character. The nature of 
this representative character, however, has been perennially debated 
on a normative basis.
A classic argument advocating political responsibility over 
strict representativeness was presented by Edmund Burke in his speech 
to the Electors of Bristol in 1774. According to Burke, the proper
^"Representational Behavior," International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, Vol. XIII, p. 474.
5
6role of the representative was to respect his constituents1 opinions, 
but not to yield to them over his own unbiased opinions concerning 
the public good.'* For Burke, the representative assembly was a 
deliberative assembly of one nation (or state) with only the interest 
of "the whole" in mind. Local prejudices and the particular interests 
of each constituency would thereby be mitigated by the rational 
faculty of the legislator serving the greater public interest.
Another prescription of the proper relationship between the 
representative and his constituency is known as the instructed 
delegate theory. Those advocating this model suggest that the primary 
responsibility of the representative is to his immediate constituency, 
or more narrowly, to the effective constituency which was instrumental 
in his election to office. By adhering to the mandate of the people, 
the representative would be most effectively representing those 
interests of his constituency which may be quite distinct and unique 
from other constituencies and which may remain otherwise unrepresented.
Out of the structure of the American two-party system, yet 
another form of representation was prescribed. This involves the 
notion of the party loyalist who, by voting the party line, would be 
responsive to both his constituency and the greater interests of the 
nation at large. The underlying assumption of this line of thought 
rests on the belief that each party generally reflects the interests
^Edmund Burke, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol," Works, 
Vol. I (London: John Childs and Son, 1854), pp. 446-447.
7and values of a certain type of constituency, the characteristics of 
which are distinct from those of the other party.
Whereas the Burkean model assumes responsibility as a necessary 
•premise, the Delegate and Party models involve an assumption of role 
orientations based upon goal expectations. Thus, the representative 
seeking re-election must show a degree of responsiveness to his 
constituency's needs if the goal of re-election is to be realized.
Inquiry into what ought to be the relationship of the repre­
sentative to his constituency elicited several normative prescriptions 
but did not encourage exacting, empirical analysis. As political 
scientists borrowed from other disciplines and developed their own 
sophisticated methodological techniques to study these questions, the 
focus turned from what "ought” to be to what "is" the nature of 
representation in American legislatures. In their comprehensive 
analysis of the role of legislators in the legislative process,
John Wahlke, et alii, labeled the distinction between the types of 
representation as differences between style and focus. The style of 
representation refers to the particular criterion of judgment the 
representatives uses in deciding on legislative issues. It is 
dependent upon how the legislator sees himself, as a free agent 
following his own conscience, or under a mandate to look at his party
Wahlke, et al., pp. 267-310.
See also Heinz Eulau, et al., "The Role of the Representative: 
Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American 
Political Science Review, 53 (1959), 742-756.
8or constituency as a reference group for instructions. The focus of 
representation refers to the particular clientele group that the 
representative feels he should conside^r in deciding on legislative 
•issues.
Heinz Eulau, et alii, tested the validity of the theoretical
distinctions referred to above in four state legislatures by means of
a questionnaire dealing with stylistic and areal-focal orientation
types.^ Responses concerning the stylistic dimension yielded three
major role types, trustee, delegate, and politico; while the areal-
focal orientations were delineated as district-oriented, state-oriented,
8and district-and-state-oriented. It should be noted that the 
distinctions among the various orientations are not clearly defined 
and representatives may find themselves adapting different orienta­
tions as specific demands upon them alter in intensity. The authors 
point out, for instance,
Burke's linkage of a particular areal focus of representation with 
a particular representational style, constitutes only a special 
case on a generic series of empirically viable relationships 
between possible and different foci of representation and 
appropriate styles of representation.9
This brief overview of role orientations shows hox>7 representa­
tives may see themselves in their representative function. Despite 
the typologies presented, many studies proceed with the assumption
^Eulau, et al., p. 749. 
8Ibid., pp. 750-753. 
9Ibid., p. 745.
9that representatives must direct their behavior in some manner 
CQnsistent with the wishes of their constituents if they plan to win
xore-election. The study of legislative voting behavior permits the 
analyst to examine the extent to which constituency interests and 
representatives’ voting patterns reflect electoral accountability.
The central research problem confronted by this study is to determine, 
via legislative voting behavior, the similarities or differences in 
electoral accountability between two state senates with strikingly 
different levels of party competition. More specifically, this study 
will- focus on determining the extent to which factionalism in a 
one-party dominant state senate serves as a surrogate for partisanship 
in explaining the strength of the relationship between district or 
constituency characteristics and legislative voting behavior. The 
underlying assumption of this study is that in both partisan and non­
partisan senates, distinct aggregate ecological characteristics of 
the senatorial districts serve as significant reference indicators 
for the decision-making actors in the political arena. Justification 
for this assumption is based on many studies of constituency- 
representative relations. For instance, W. A. Crane’s 1960 study of 
the deliberations on daylight savings time in the lower house of the 
Wisconsin Assembly questioned the extent to which the votes of
^ S e e  Julius Turner and Edward Schneier, Jr., Party and 
Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1970); and Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of 
Congressional Voting; (Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 1958).
10
representatives are consistent with the wishes of their respective 
constituents. The bill in question, if passed, would have had a 
differential impact on rural and urban dwellers, and representatives 
from these districts were predicted to vote in accordance with that 
distinction. The study revealed, by comparing Assembly votes with a 
later referendum on the same issue, that 85 percent of the assemblymen 
voted in accord with their district’s interests. Of the 15 percent 
who voted inconsistently, all claimed to have' misread their consti-  ^
tuencies with the exception of one assemblyman who admittedly voted 
without regard to his constituency."^
The Crane study reveals, in this particular case, that the 
link between constituency interests and representatives’ decisions, 
as expressed in their voting record, is quite strong. The study was 
somewhat limited in its generality due to only one issue being under­
taken for analysis. In 1963, however, Miller and Stokes addressed 
themselves to the question of whether the saliency of legislative 
action to the public is so different in quality and degree on different
issues that the legislator is subject to very different constraints
12
from his constituency. Their study also sought to describe the 
causal connections between a constituency's attitude and its
“ w. A. Crane, "Do Representatives Represent?" Journal of 
Politics, 22 (May 1960), 295-299.
12Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency 
Influence in Congress," American Political Science Preview, 57 (March 
1963), 45-56.
11
representative’s roll-call behavior. This would explain which of two 
alternative ways a constituency can control or influence the policy 
actions of its representative. The district could choose a represen­
tative who shares its views and would reflect those views in following 
his own convictions, or the representative would follow his percep­
tions of district attitudes in order to win re-election (see Figure 1).
From their investigation of three policy domains, Miller and 
Stokes found evidence that representatives vote both their own policy 
views and their perceptions of their constituents' views, depending on 
the issue at hand. The strength of the intercorrelations, however, 
showed that the congressman’s perception of his constituency's 
attitudes was the main path by which the local district ultimately 
influenced the representative's output, especially when the represen­
tative felt the issue to be both visible and salient to his 
13constituency. In light of this finding, the senators studied in 
this research may be likely to use their respective district 
demographics as cues contributing to the development of their 
perceptions of constituency attitudes.
13Ibid. , pp. 51-53.
C.f. Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage 
between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A
Causal Model," American Political Science Review, 60 (March 1966), 
62-72. Utilizing the Simon-Blalock technique for making causal infer­
ences, Cnudde and McCrone improve upon Miller and Stokes’ model and 
correct the direction of the causal links between representative’s 
attitude and representative's perception of constituency's attitude. 
Overall, the authors reconfirm the impact of Congressmen's perceptions 
in linking mass attitudes to policy making.
12
FIGURE 1
CONNECTIONS BETOKEN A CONSTITUENCY’S ATTITUDE 
AND ITS REPRESENTATIVE'S ROLL CALL BEHAVIOR
Representative's
Attitude
Representative's 
Roll Call Behavior
Constituency's 
Attitude
N/
Representative's 
Perception of/ 
Constituency1s
Attitude
Sources Warren E, Miller, and Donald E.. Stokes, ’’Constituency 
Influence in Congress,11 American Political Science Review, 5 (March 
1963), 50 .
13
In an effort to examine the influence of additional variables
on legislative voting behavior, Waldman, in 1967, demonstrates the
combined influence of the constituency vote for the congressman and
for the President on legislative voting behavior. He concludes that
the model of representation which most closely fits the case of the
14
liberal-voting congressman is that of the instructed delegate. The 
representative would be taking his voting cue from the large presiden­
tial vote in relation to the vote he received in his district. This 
study acids credibility to Miller and Stokes' findings in that it shows 
again that congressmen rely on their perceptions of constituency 
attitudes as voting cues and that those perceptions can be based on 
various information flows to them. Although this study shows a strong, 
positive correlation between the selected variables and voting behavior, 
it cannot be determined from the data to what extent the congressmen 
actually use this information as voting cues.
If Eulau, et alii, and Miller and Stokes are correct in 
suggesting that congressmen seeking re-election will be responsive 
to the particular needs of their districts, it can be assumed that 
particular bills benefiting certain constituencies will be supported 
by more congressmen from those districts than by congressmen whose 
districts would not benefit. Consequently, in a study similar to 
Crane's (1960), Clotfelter in 1970 tested the hypothesis that
L. K. Waldman, "Liberalism in Congressmen and the 
Presidential Vote in Their Districts," Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 11 (February 1967), 73-83.
1.4
legislators from states that depend heavily on defense spending will 
be more likely to support legislation to increase or maintain defense 
spending than legislators who do not represent such states. The 
results of the research revealed that the most widely used measure of 
defense spending, military prime contracts, correlated very poorly 
with roll-call votes. Although some of the other defense-related 
variables correlated better with roll-call voting, the general 
conclusion had to be that the representatives were not noticeably
15
responsive to their constituents in this defense spending dimension.
These series of studies have shown that although representa­
tives may perceive themselves as following a particular role requiring 
cues from their constituencies to shape their perceptions of their 
respective constituent’s attitudes, the extent to which they correctly 
read and respond to those cues may substantially differ.
Previous studies have revealed that Party is the most impor­
tant predictor of roll-call behavior, while constituency factors
16
explain most of the deviation from party votes. As mentioned 
earlier, one model of representation, the responsible party model,
states that the representatives who vote the party line are being
/
15James Clotfelter, "Senate Voting and Constituency Stake in 
Defense Spending," Journal of Politics, 32 (November 1970), 979-983.
16See Frank Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Co., 1968). pp. 134-168; and Angus
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes,
The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); and
William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), chap. 3.
15
responsive to their constituents' needs through the assumption that 
the parties differ in terms of socio-economic constituency character­
istics. In 1963, Froman examined this assumption in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the differences between Democrats and Republicans are 
not merely a matter of party label or ideology, but are rooted in 
basic differences in the kinds of constituencies from which Democrats 
and Republicans come. Using socio-economic data and the Kennedy 
Support Score of liberal-conservative tendencies as independent 
variables, Froman found that Democrats rated high percentages on 
owner-occupied dwelling units, nonwhite population, population density 
and urban residents, while Republicans rated low percentages in the 
same categories. This data indicates that Republicans would tend to 
be "conservative" and Democrats "liberal," a finding confirmed by the 
correlations on the Kennedy Support Score.^ It was predicted and 
confirmed in this study that Democrats from conservative-type 
districts and Republicans from liberal-type districts would tend to 
vote more conservatively and liberally, respectively, than their 
party colleagues. This phenomenon has been confirmed elsewhere in
regard to the voting behavior of representatives from districts
18atypical of their party's ecological characteristics.
17Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Inter-Party Constituency Differences 
and Congressional Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 
57 (1963), 57-62.
18See Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the 
State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western Political
Quarterly, 14 (June 1961), 460-472.
16
The findings of the above two studies are not entirely conclu­
sive. In 1963, Stone questioned Froman's contention that inter-party 
differences can be attributed to constituency differences, especially 
when Democrats and Republicans represent the same kind of constitu­
encies. By holding constituency factors constant while measuring 
party differences, Stone finds coalition formations supporting 
Democrats and Republicans of the same districts divergent on bases 
independent of socio-economic factors. Many Democrats from normally 
Republican districts tended to vote liberally, not conservatively as 
froman would predict.
The hypothesis examined by Froman was tested again in 1964 by 
.Flinn. To the extent that parties find their support in contrasting 
constituencies, party responsibility is the consequence. Legislators 
from similar constituencies will allegedly vote together and in 
opposition to legislators from constituencies with contrasting 
characteristics. Data from this Ohio study, however, revealed that 
rural Democrats and rural Republicans do not vote alike, nor du urban 
Republicans and urban Democrats. Rather, likeness was apparent
20between urban and rural Democrats and urban and rural Republicans.
His conclusion was that the view that on party opposition votes
19Clarence Stone, "Inter-Party Constituency Differences and 
Congressional Voting Behavior: A Partial Dissent," American Political
Science Review, 57 (September 1963), 665-670.
Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some 
Causal Factors," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964),
6.0-71.
17
members vote their constituencies and that different parties represent 
different constituencies was incorrect. The differences in constitu­
encies did, however, relate to intra-party differences to some degree 
where members from districts typical of the party supported the party
position more often than members from districts atypical of the 
21party. The implications of the study seem to weaken the argument
supporting the instructed delegate model and favors the support of
the responsible party model of representation.
In a partial description of the theory behind the responsible
party model, Eulau states,
. . . Competitive parties are structural requisites of the 
democratic political system in that they facilitate the achieve­
ment of some of its goals, notably the crystallization, institu­
tionalization and resolution of conflicts.^2
This being the case, two assumptions can be made. First, where there 
exists a greater propensity for conflict, that is, urban areas, one 
would expect to find a competitive party system. Second, where a 
high degree of party competition is found, one would expect to find a 
high degree of party cohesion, since such unity would appear effica­
cious to conflict resolution. In this regard, Jewell, in 1955, finds 
that the degree of party voting appears to be significantly higher in 
those two-party states which are larger and more urban, but that among
21
Ibid., p. 70.
22
Heinz Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The
Case of Ohio," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 1 (1957), 125.
18
those states with two strong parties, those with the most intense
party competition are not necessarily those with the highest levels 
23
of party voting. In 1957, Eulau confirmed Jewell’s finding that
there is a direct relationship between the character of an area's
ecological structure and the structure of an area’s party system;
urban structures are conducive to the existence of competitive party
systems, whereas rural areas appear to be related to noncompetitive or
24
one-party systems.
In a response and extended replication of Eulau's study, Gold
and Schmidhauser found that among the ninety-nine counties of Iowa in
1960, there was not a single positive correlation between degree of
25
urbanization and intensity of party competition. Thus, with the 
accumulation of studies, one encounters the emergence of numerous 
contradictions. The differences may be due to methodological 
variances, to unique institutional discrepancies in each legislature 
studied, or to any number of intervening variables which may account 
for some major differences in the conflicting conclusions.
In an attempt to take measure of a possible intervening 
variable, McRae, in 1952, finds that the socio-economic characteristics
23Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State 
Legislatures," American Political Science Review, 49 (1955), 773-791.
24
Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems," pp. 134-135.
25David Gold and John Schmidhauser, "Urbanization and Party 
Competition: The Case of Iowa," Midwest Journal of Political Science,
4 (1960), 62-75.
19
of a constituency do influence the roll-call behavior of representa­
tives in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, but that the
closeness of the vote in the district has a distinct effect over and
26
above socio-economic characteristics. In the study, it was found
that the closer the characteristics of the constituency were to the
general characteristics of the party, the party cohesion appeared
greater; however, when close election margins were introduced, party
cohesion was less. This was particularly noted in those districts
atypical of the party to which the representative belonged. Dye's
study of the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1961 confirmed McRae's
findings, indicating that the closeness of the vote may be an
important intervening variable. In contrast, however, Dye's research
also reported the relationship between constituency characteristics
27and voting behavior to be very weak for the Pennsylvania Senate.
Again, one confronts conflicting results.
The research employed in this study will attempt to re-examine 
a number of the hypotheses referred to above as they pertain to the 
two states of this analysis. Although this research cannot hope to 
resolve the contradictions thus far encountered in the literature of 
legislative voting behavior, it can provide further empirical evidence
26Duncan McRae, Jr., "The Relation between Roll-Call Votes and 
Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American 
Political Science Review, 46 (1952), 1046-1055.
Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influence in 
the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," Western 
Political Quarterly, 22 (June 1969), 266.
20
supporting the findings similar to those contained within the scope of 
this inquiry.
Regardless of the role a legislator may perceive himself
acting in, it is obvious that in his legislative capacity many other
demands may be put to him other than those of his constituency.
"The more active a representative becomes in the legislative process,
28
the less likely he is to act publicly simply as a representative.”
There are a number of political actors besides constituents who have
varying degrees of influence on the legislator's decision-making
process. Committee members, staff, colleagues, interest groups, and
the executive branch are all possible reference groups to which the
legislator may turn or be advised by on how to vote on specific pieces 
29
of legislation. In some instances, a representative's decision 
processes for roll-call votes can be described as repetitive problem­
solving behavior. Their responses to legislation may become routine
30
and independent of the bill being considered. The representative 
may rely on a variety of sources of voting cues without ever having to 
analyze a particular bill in regard to its relative impact on 
constituency, party, or his own ideological predilections. The
See Helen Ingram, "The Impact of Constituency on the 
Process of Legislating,” Western Political Quarterly, 22 (June 1969), 
266.
29See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions 
(Now York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 29-198.
30
J. E. Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Roll-Call 
Voting,” American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971), 451-470.
21
premises that Shapiro utilizes in the development of a simulation model
of roll-call voting in the House of Representatives may illustrate the
variety of influences acting on a representative and the reference
•groups which he may or may not refer to on any one issue. The
premises presume that there is a predisposition toward voting on a
bill that a legislator develops when he assesses his past voting
behavior on that type of bill; that he may seek or be confronted by
individuals and groups in the House with positive or negative
positions on the bill; that he will consider the bill in terms of its
benefits for his constituency or region; that he may have his own
ideological posture on the bill; or that he may feel inclined to
follow executive wishes on the legislation, independent of party 
31
position. Investigations into each of these dimensions have sought 
to describe the relative association these variables may have with 
legislative behavior. The analysis undertaken in this paper, although 
acknowledging the contribution of other variables in explaining roll- 
call behavior, has concentrated on constituency-related variables as 
their association to representational behavior in terms of electoral 
accountability seems singularly important.
The literature on legislative voting behavior is extensive.
Thus far, this paper has presented only a sample of some of the more 
frequently cited studies in the field which provide a theoretical
M. J. Shapiro, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer
Simulation of Roll Call Voting," American Political Science Review, 62 
(June 1968), 494-517.
22
background for this research. Most of these studies were quite
specific in their design, and only a few were concerned exclusively
with state legislative systems. Many of the studies which are
conducted at the state level are indebted to V. 0. Key for the wealth
of information he provided through his studies of eleven southern 
32states. Duane Lockard's regional study of seven New England states
also generated a wide inventory of propositions using, like Key,
33electoral data as a central focus for empirical investigations.
Both authors followed their regional studies with broader, comparative 
works examining some of their earlier findings within this larger
34
framework. In 1957, J. C. Wahlke, et alii, conducted a comprehen­
sive1 study of four state legislatures during a single legislative
session to gain knowledge about generic problems of legislative
35institutions and processes in American state governments. In 1966, 
Jewell and Patterson synthesized a wide range of legislative research 
at the state level with the intention of giving a descriptive account 
of the structure and functions of the American legislative system at 
one point in time, and explaining behavioral patterns of the legislative
32
V. 0. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Random House, 1949).
33
Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959).
34
See V. 0. Key, American State Politics (New York: A. A.
Knopf, 1956); and Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local 
Government (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963).
ahIke, pp. 237-431*
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process over a period of time. These works provide in a cumulative 
manner much of our knowledge about state legislatures, both singly 
and comparatively.
Many studies narrower in scope than those mentioned above have
focused their research on specific hypotheses, either explicitly
stated or inferred from the above studies. However, the Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences notes:
. . . quantitatively speaking, the literature to date offers 
primarily studies of a single legislature rather than comparative 
studies, either of different legislatures or of a single legisla­
ture at different points in time. As a result, it is relatively 
difficult to establish generalizations by cumulating findings 
about legislative behavior even in a particular legislature, 
despite the qualitative richness with many available studies.
It is hoped that the research presented in this study, being 
comparative in design, will contribute to the expanding body of 
knowledge of legislative behavior at the state level by clarifying 
the nature of the relationship between ecological variables and 
voting behavior in two contrasting state senates.
A few studies have examined the relationship of ecological 
variables to voting behavior in order to determine the degree to 
which the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of a 
representative's district correlate to his voting record. This
36Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative 
Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966).
37"Political Behavior," International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, Vol. IX (New York: Macmillan Co. and Free Press,
1968), p. 239.
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information would theoretically give the analyst greater predictive
measures to determine how a representative will vote on legislation
affecting his particular constituency. Some of these variables have
been examined to determine their relationship to the make-up of the
38
two major political parties. Other studies have related ecological
39variables to voting behavior on specific types of legislation.
Overall, there is considerable evidence that legislators will in many
ways reflect the ecological and demographic characteristics of their
40districts regardless of their own individual backgrounds. Although 
these studies have shown that a significant relationship exists between 
aggregate territorial data and representatives' decisions as expressed 
in their roll-call votes, they generally do not attempt to explain 
the nature and extent of the intervening processes involved in the 
relationships. LeBlanc's 1969 study attempted to rectify this 
deficiency by measuring the extent to which levels of partisanship 
affected the strength of the relationship between ecological- 
constituency variables and roll-call votes. His findings indicate
38See Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems”; Gold 
and Schmidhauser; Froman; Stone; and Flinn.
39See Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior 
in a One-Party State Legislature," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 
(1962), 185-200; and N. Heighberger, "Representative's Constituency 
and National Security," Western Political Quarterly, 26 (June 1973), 
224-235.
40
See W. W. Crane, "The Legislative Struggle in Wisconsin: 
Decision-Making in the 1957 Wisconsin Assembly," unpublished Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1959.
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that the more partisan-minded senates display higher average correla­
tions with ecological variables than the lesser partisan-minded 
41senates. By introducing an essentially nonpartisan, one-party 
dominant state senate into the equation, the research presented in 
this paper will attempt to show that partisanship, per se, only partly 
explains the strength of the association between the aggregate data 
and the voting behavior, and that the degree of association can be 
better attributed to voting alignments based on common constituency 
characteristics, even in the absence of strong partisanship. Due to 
the nature of the data in this research, this study will also be able 
to examine a number of propositions concerning constituency influence 
on voting behavior.
Hugh L. LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and
Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 
(February 1969), 33-57.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
This study will examine the impact of ecological variables on 
voting behavior on selected issues in the competitive, partisan state 
senate of California and the noncompetitive, one-party dominant state 
senate of Florida. By comparing the differential or nondifferential 
effect of those variables as functions of levels of part is can ship, 
this study will be able to comment on the accuracy of LeBlancTs 
findings regarding partisanship and on the question of electoral 
accountability per ecological association with roll-call votes.
Using data from roll-call votes, census and demographic information 
for the years 1961 and 1965, this research will examine LeBlanc’s 
conclusions on voting with selected issues indicative of intra-party 
conflict in Florida and inter-party conflict in California.
According to LeBlanc, higher degrees of partisanship relate 
to stronger correlations between ecological variables and roll-call 
votes than do lower degrees of partisanship. The rationale is that 
in highly partisan states, the constituency characteristics of each 
party are fairly well divided along party lines. Thus, by voting 
with his party, a legislator is simultaneously voting in accord with 
his constituents’ needs. LeBlanc remarks:
26
27
It is probably true that legislative partisanship is 
encouraged when party and constituency factors are interlocking 
variables influencing roll-call votes. One might argue further 
that the successful marriage of party and constituency provides 
the linkage between legislative divisions and constituency 
characteristics required of responsible political parties.4-2
Since Florida is a one-party dominant state, it would appear
logical to hypothesize that the influence of ecological-constituency
variables on legislative voting behavior would be considerably less
in Florida than the effect of those same variables on legislative
voting in California, thereby concurring with LeBlanc’s findings on
the importance of partisanship as an intervening variable affecting
the strength of the relationship between ecological variables and
roll-call voting. Zeller, however, states that factionalism may have
43
the same effect as a two-party system. V. 0. Key categorizes
Florida as a multi-factional state based on a diversity of economic
44interests rooted within geographical boundaries. Examining Zeller's 
hypothesis, Parsons finds that conflict on selected issues in the 
Florida Senate approximates the operations of a two-party system based
42
Hugh L. LeBlanc, ’’Voting in State Senates: Party and
Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 
(February 1969), 57.
43
Belle Zeller, American State Legislatures (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1954).
44
V. 0. Key, American State Politics (New York: A. A. Knopf,
1956), pp. 82-105.
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on constituency differences. It can be expected, therefore, that 
the bi-factional character of the Florida Senate will serve the same 
function as a two-party system, thereby making it amenable to 
‘comparative analysis with the competitive and partisan California 
Senate. Just as the Democrats and Republicans generally represent 
different types of constituencies with sometimes conflicting needs 
and values in a partisan state, it is hypothesized that the legisla­
tors of northern and southern Florida represent constituencies with 
similarly differentiated needs and values and will align their voting 
patterns accordingly. Consequently, the difference between the 
selected variables and roll-call voting in Florida and California 
should be only marginal.
Scope
Fextf studies have been concerned with the analysis of 
legislative behavior in state senates. Yet, the forces acting upon 
and within these upper houses are similar to those operating within 
the context of the legislative system as a whole. Every legislative 
body is unique, but there exist uniformities in patterns of 
legislative behavior which, through carefully applied empirical 
research, can be explained in terms of common processes of legislative 
functions. Although the generality of this study is limited in its
Malcolm B. Parsons, "Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party 
Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961," American Political
Science Review. 56 (1962), 605-614.
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use of only two state senates for comparative purposes, it is hoped 
that the research design employed herein will be amenable to replica­
tion using other states and larger legislative bodies as an analytical 
base.
The states chosen for this analysis were selected on the basis 
of their broad, common characteristics and their satisfaction of the 
partisan-factional requirement. Both states are coastal, have signi­
ficant urban and rural elements, have a high rate of population growth 
from outside the state, and are both somewhat atypical of the states
in their geographic region in that they resemble each other more
46along socio-economic lines than they do their bordering states. The 
availability of senate roll-call data was also an important criterion 
in the selection of these two states.
%. The two years selected for this research, 1961 and 1965, were
chosen for three considerations. First, they fall within the time 
period used by Jewell and Patterson to classify states by level of 
party competition. This study used that classification in the initial 
selection of state senates. Second, by using years which offset 
election years, it is possible to check for consistencies and guard 
against "apparent trends" which may be unique to a given legislative 
session. Third, roll-call and other data were available for these
46
Both Key and Parsons note Florida’s more industrially 
advanced status among the Southern states, while LeBlanc comments 
that California does not follow the legislative patterns exhibited 
by the other partisan states in his study despite its industrialized 
status.
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years while unavailable for several previous and later years.
Method of Analysis 
In order to clarify some of the terms and concepts employed in 
this study, the following operational definitions will be used:
Ecological variables: aggregate territorial characteris­
tics derived from the distribution of individual attributes within a 
Senatorial District.
Competitive two-party state: a state with a partisan
legislature in which during the years 1947-1966 neither party had
dominant legislative control, and in most cases where party control
47of the legislature approximated control of the governorship. The 
California Senate was under Democratic control eight years,
Republican control ten years, and was equally balanced twice. During 
this same period, each party controlled the governmorship ten years.
Noncompetitive, one-party dominant state: a state in
which the same party controlled the governorship and both houses with 
only slightly more than negligible minority representation (10 percent
This definition is used by Jewell and Patterson to classify 
state legislatures according to degree of two-party competition. See 
Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in 
the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 143-144.
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or less for any one year) during the period of 1947-1966. Florida 
has met this requirement until recent years.
Partisanship: pertaining to California, the degree of
partisanship will be determined by three indices:
a. party voting on roll-calls on which a majority of
the members of one party vote in opposition to a
49
majority of the members of the other.
b. Rice Index of Cohesion.
c. Index of Likeness.
Factionalism: pertaining to Florida, factional alignments
will be determined through matrix analysis of senators with Index of 
Agreement (I.A.) base scores above 75. The I.A. scores will be 
calculated from intra-party opposition votes where a minimum of
48Jewell and Patterson, p. 143. The authors label this type 
of state one-party; however, to differentiate between actual one-party 
states such as Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South 
Carolina with negligible minority representation, and states with more 
than negligible minority representation, this writer is calling this 
latter group one-party dominant. This classification does not include 
modified one-party dominant legislatures wherein the same party 
controlled both houses but not always the governorship during the 1947- 
1966 period.
49This is the measure used by Congressional Quarterly. Turner 
used 90 percent and Jewell used an index of cohesion of 80 for both 
parties on opposition votes. Since the vast majority of state legis­
lative roll-calls are unanimous or near unanimous, a simple majority 
differential is required to provide sufficient data for a party voting 
index when only a small sample of roll-calls are being examined.
50
See L. E. Anderson, et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 32-48.
Anderson provides excellent descriptions and explanations of these 
commonly used indices.
32
10 percent of the Democratic senators vote in opposition to the
. • 51remaining Democrats.
The hypotheses to be tested in this study, as they relate to 
the LeBlanc article and other propositions regarding legislative voting 
behavior, are:
1. Voting in a partisan-minded senate will display 
similar average correlations with constituency variables as voting 
in an essentially nonpartisan, one-party dominant senate.
2. Intra-party voting cleavages will most often occur 
among senators representing districts atypical of their party 
identification.
3. Factional voting cleavages will resemble party voting 
cleavages on certain issues associated with national party 
identifications.
4. Legislators from similar constituencies will vote 
alike and in opposition to legislators from constituencies with 
contrasting ecological characteristics.
5. The voting alignment in the Florida Senate will 
parallel to a significant degree a sectional alignment of the consti­
tuencies. The majority faction will correspond to the strong 
Democratic districts of north Florida, while the minority faction will 
correspond to those Democratic constituencies of south Florida that
This method of identifying legislative factions has proven 
successful elsewhere; see Anderson, pp. 40-43.
are involved in emergent Republicanism.
The ecological variables which will be tested for their 
association to roll-call votes in the specific issue domains are the 
following:
1. Presence or absence of Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas
2. Population per square mile
3. Percentage of population which is urban
4. Percentage of population which is Negro
5 . Percentage of population which is of foreign stock
6. Percentage of population employed in manufacturing
7. Percentage of population with white collar jobs
8. Percentage of population with income under $3,000.
9. Percentage of population with income $10,000. and over
10. Number of farms in district 
The data for the above percentages for each district will be 
derived from the County and City Data Book for the years selected in 
this research.^
Delineation of Senatorial Districts into "northern” and 
"southern" regions is based on William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth,
The Politics of Mis-Representation (Baton-Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana
State University Press, 1962), p. 45.
53See United States Bureau of the Census, County and City Data 
Book, 1967, A Statistical Abstract Supplement (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1967). The ecological 
variables for both years of this study are based on census information 
for 1960 and 1961.
34
The issue domains were selected on the basis of their ability 
to elicit factional and partisan voting behavior in the senates. 
Experience in legislative behavior analysis has consistently shown
the following issue areas to produce most of the voting cleavages
„ . 1 . 1  54found in state legislatures.
1. Taxation and Finance
2. Conservation and Agriculture
3. Constitutional Revision
4. Health and Welfare
5. Race Relations
6. Apportionment
7. Education
8. Labor
9. Regulation of Business
The roll-call votes for each issue area, as found in the 
California and Florida Journal of the Senate will be examined.^ The 
respective State Rosters and Blue Books will provide district and
54For an excellent explanation of the various legislative 
issues and the process whereby they, are categorized, see Wayne L. 
Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative
Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1967).
“*"*See California Secretary of State, Journal of the Senate, 
Vols. I-IV, 1961; California Secretary of State, Journal of the Senate, 
Vols. I-V, 1965; Florida Secretary of State, Journal of the Senate, 
Vols. I-III, 1961; and Florida Secretary of State, Journal of the 
Senate, Vols. I-IV, 1965.
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party information on each s e n a t o r . A n y  missing data will be 
provided by the respective State Election Commissions. All roll-calls 
in which a 10 percent opposition vote is present will be used for 
further analysis. The voting record of each senator in all opposition 
votes meeting the 10 percent requirement will be calculated into an 
Agreement Index of the number of times the representative voted with 
the Democratic majority. The index ranges from zero to 100, with a 
score of zero indicating complete opposition to the Democratic Party 
majority in California and Florida, and a score of 100 indicating 
perfect loyalty to the Democratic P a r t y . A  Pearson product-moment 
correlation will measure the linear relation between the independent 
constituency variables and the voting indexes of the senators for each 
state. Comparison of the correlations between the two states will 
reveal whether the lack of a formal partisan structure in Florida 
diminishes the relationship between ecological variables and senate 
voting as compared to California. The strength of the correlations 
will show the extent to which the selected independent variables 
relate to roll-call voting in the two senates.
Examination of the ecological basis for the Florida factions
See California Secretary of State, California Blue Book, 
1961; California Secretary of State, California Roster, 1965; Florida 
Secretary of State, Florida Blue Book, 1961; and Florida Secretary of 
State, Florida Blue Book, 1965.
^This is the same index calculated by LeBlanc for the 
senators of his study. See Hugh L. LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: 
Party and Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 8 (February 1969), p. 48.
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and the two California parties will reveal whether or not factional 
and party identity relates to contrasting ecological characteristics. 
Cohesion and likeness scores will indicate the relative influence of 
contrasting constituency characteristics on voting behavior in the 
senates. The districts of senators whose voting index falls below 
their party's mean score will be examined to determine whether they 
are atypical of their party.
Limitations
The research presented in this paper is confronted with three
limitations: the ecological fallacy; roll-call analysis; and the use
of only two states to test the hypotheses.
The ecological fallacy questions the validity of inferences
58drawn from different levels of analysis. In this research, the 
question concerns the validity of generalizations made about individual 
voting behavior on the basis of aggregate demographic characteristics. 
Erik Allardt, however, defends the use of ecological analysis 
primarily because the inferences drawn from different levels of
The term was first used and explained by William S. Robinson 
in "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American 
Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 351-357. For a critique of the 
article, see Herbert Menzel, "Comment of Robinson's Ecological 
Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological 
Review, 15 (1950), 674.
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analysis tend to have a high informative value. The United Nations 
International Data Confrontation Seminar reports that on both 
technical and conceptual grounds, it is clear that the case against 
ecological data and inferences drawn therefrom has been greatly 
exaggerated.
. . . ecological studies that interrelate the characteristics of 
particular groups, populations, or areas can be productive of 
important findings and can certainly serve as useful if not 
indispensable supplements to investigations at the individual 
level. Moreover, investigators are often interested in the 
characteristics of a group or territorial unit in order to provide 
a context for understanding individual characteristics.^
Contextual analysis as used in this study is useful, for the 
ecological correlations may tell something about territorial units 
which can be used as contextual properties to explain the variations 
in the correlated variables. Contextual generalizations, such as 
this study is expected to generate, tend to be less trivial than 
generalizations based entirely on grouped or entirely on individual 
data. However, it must be realized that the external validity of 
those generalizations may be threatened by intervening variables which 
cannot be accounted for in the methodology of this research.
The second limitation concerns the use of roll-call data for
Erik Allardt, "Aggregate Analysis: Its Informative Value,"
Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Mattei 
Dogan and Stein Rokkan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1969), pp. 41-51.
^United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, "Ecological Data in Comparative Research," Report on a 
First International Data Confrontation Seminar, ed. Jerome M. Clubb, 
1970.
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analytical purposes. The roll-call vote is not a perfect index of
each senator's contribution to a decision. Nor is it assumed that
the vote indicates how a member really feels about an issue.
Roll-call statistics reveal how a legislator voted, not why. However,
the roll-call is a significant step in the decision-making process of
a representative. If a legislator is forced to choose among the
competing demands of his constituency, party leadership, or committee
colleagues, he may resolve the conflict by playing different roles.
Regardless of his choice, his public role stands revealed by the
nature of his vote. Causal relationships cannot be proven by roll-call
statistics, but, as noted by Jewell and Patterson,
Roll-call statistics do provide evidence . . . that may be added 
to our other sources of knowledge about the legislative system, 
so as to provide the basis for judgments about the importance of 
party, constituency, and other sources of voting cues.^~
Limited time and financial resources permit only two states 
to be analyzed in this study. The history, processes and mechanism 
involved in factionalism and partisanship may vary from state to state, 
thereby limiting the* scope of the generalizations of this inquiry. 
Despite the differences among the states, there also exist generic 
similarities which do allow generalizations of a narrow scope to be 
made.
Jewell and Patterson, p. 416.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
The ability of the nine selected issue areas to actually 
elicit intra-party and inter-party conflict was examined to determine 
the extent of party voting in California and intra-party opposition 
in Florida. Three measures were used in this regard: the Rice Index
of Cohesion, the Index of Likeness, and Yule's Q. The Index of 
Cohesion has a range of zero to 100, with zero indicating no cohesion 
and 100 indicating total cohesion in party voting. The Index of 
Likeness, a measure of inter-group difference, has the same range 
with zero representing total dissimilarity in group voting, while 100 
represents complete similarity in voting response. The third measure 
is Yule's Q, with a range of -1 to +1; the extremes indicate strong 
association, with convergence meaning decreasing strength of 
association.
Table 1 illustrates the wide range of cohesion and likeness 
scores found in California during the 1961 and 1965 sessions. It can 
be seen, with the exception of the apportionment issue, that both 
parties were generally cohesive on each issue area, with race 
relations manifesting the highest cohesion. The low cohesion 
displayed on the apportionment issue is somewhat surprising, for 
apportionment bills generally evoke strong partisan responses as each
39
TABLE 1
MEAN INDEX OF COHESION AND INDEX OF LIKENESS (IL) ON 
SELECTED ISSUE AREAS IN CALIFORNIA, 1961, 1965
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1961
DEM 49 38 65 56 58 59 58 63 68
REP 82 20 62 61 58 54 54 100 52
IL 82 91 98 85 100 95 80 82 92
(N) 9 2 11 15 14 29 14 3 3
1965
DEM 82 64 70 74 63 64 77 95 56
REP 67 21 58 43 58 57 40 57 66
IL 92 72 99 82 98 71 79 81 82
(N) 4 3 31 29 9 15 17 2 5
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party is directly affected by the outcome of such legislation. In
view of the fact that the California Senate was reapportioned in 1961,
62
the cohesion index appears even more striking for that year. In 
comparison to the cohesion scores, the Index of Likeness (IL) scores 
show that despite general cohesion, there exists considerable 
similarity in group voting, especially during the 1961 session. Thus, 
although there exists cohesion within parties on the issues, there 
also exists agreement between parties to a large extent.
The measure of association used to determine the degree of 
inter-party difference on the issue areas in Yule's Q. This measure 
will reveal differences between Republicans and Democrats in terms of 
the portion of total support or opposition each party supplies. Chi 
square values are also tabulated to assess the existence of differences 
between the parties beyond the expectations of chance. Table 2 shows 
that the strength of inter-party differences is strongest in the area 
of race relations, weakest in business regulation, health and welfare, 
and conservation and agriculture, while somewhat moderate in the 
remaining issue domains. These findings suggest that on at least 
half of the selected issue areas, competitive party voting exists in 
the California Senate. If this portion of the research had revealed 
marginal or no indications of partisan conflict in California, any 
forthcoming conclusions regarding the initial hypothesis would be
See Howard D. Hamilton, Legislative Apportionment: Key to
Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 157.
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TABLE 2
INTER-PARTY DIFFERENCES ON SELECTED ISSUE 
AREAS IN CALIFORNIA, 1961, 1965
1961 1965
Conservation and 
Agriculture
2 2 
X Q X Q
Labor .50* -.16 5.9 .39
Race Relations 5.5 -1.0 6.2 .83
Constitutional Revision 20.6 .46 32.7 .52
2.7 .17 31.6 .23
Business Regulation .01* .01 .20* .09
Education 9.9 -.35 39.8 .46
Health and Welfare .10* -.05 .10* .03
Aoportionment .50* .20 9.7 .57
Taxation and Finance 10.5 -.55 1.7* .38
d.f. = 1
*not significant at p = .05
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spurious. Although Jewell and Patterson used a different method in 
their classification of California, their partisanship ranking of the 
state appears consistent with the findings of this research.
To measure the extent of intra-party opposition in Florida 
requires a different methodological approach than the one utilized 
for California. In hypothesizing that factionalism is operating 
within the Florida Senate, this study must first identify the factions, 
then reveal the basis for the alignments. If intra-party opposition 
exists in Florida, the Index of Cohesion for the Democratic majority 
should be generally low across the selected issue domains. Table 3 
shows that the cohesion scores for the Florida Senate are generally 
lower than those found in California but are considerably higher on 
several issue areas than would be expected. Recalling Miller and 
Stokes' findings, it may be that only those issues which are perceived 
to be visible and salient by the legislators elicit intra-party 
opposition in a factionally dominated senate. Note the discrepancies 
in cohesion scores on the education and apportionment issues for the 
two years. Apparently the saliency of the issues can vary tremen­
dously over time.
To identify the factions in the Florida Senate, matrices of 
interpersonal agreement index scores were calculated. All senators 
whose scores were 75 or higher were compared to find a faction of 
senators whose agreement scores were interrelated at the 75 base and
v,
above.
For 1961, a minority faction of thirteen senators was
44
TABLE 3
MEAN INDEX OF COHESION ON SELECTED ISSUE 
AREAS IN FLORIDA, 1961, 1965
1961 1965
Labor 45.0 N.A.
Race Relations 30.0 N.A.
Constitutional Revision 42.7 N.A.
Conservation and Agriculture 44.5 50.5
Business Regulation 35.4 40.5
Education 66.0 18.4
Health and Welfare 45.9 56.3
Apportionment 64.3 27.1
Taxation and Finance 44.6 45.8
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discovered. In relation to the rest of the senate, an Index of 
Likeness of 10 was found. For 1965, a faction of twelve senators 
existed with an IL score of 11. Given the presence of a factional 
group in Florida, the next step is to determine the basis for this 
particular alignment of senators.
One way of examining the hypothesis that the bifactional 
character of the Florida Senate divides along an urban-rural cleavage 
is to compare the percentage of voting pairs, as evidenced by the 
Index of Agreement, among senators representing Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (SMSA) districts and senators from non-SMSA districts. 
Although SMSA is not in itself an accurate measure of urbanization and 
only denotes the presence or absence of a statistically defined 
metropolitan area, it suffices as a generic index of a dichotomous 
demographic trait.
When the Index of Agreement is averaged for all senators 
representing SMSAs, a mean of 58 is found. This means, of course, 
that in 1961 on 85 roll-call votes, the "urban" senators voted alike 
on only 58 percent of the bills. With such low cohesion on the part 
of the urban legislators, it is unlikely that an urban-rural cleavage 
accounts for any extensive faction within the senate. Although the 
"rural" senators display a slightly higher agreement percentage, they 
do not, as a group, indicate a pervasive factional alignment. The 
same method was used to determine whether the senate divided along a 
north-south cleavage, as suggested by Parsons. The mean agreement 
index for northern senators in 1961 is 63 and only 60 for the southern
46
senators. One can only conclude on the basis of this information that 
nprthern and southern divisions, like the urban-rural cleavage, do not 
indicate the presence of extensive bifactionalism in the Florida 
Senate. .The figures for 1965, with slight variation, appear 
consistent with the finding for 1961 (see Table 4).
Although this research finds no evidence of pervasive 
factionalism along regional or urban-rural lines, it may be that the 
factions that were isolated earlier or those senators with very high 
agreement scores will conform to such distinctions. Tables 5 and 6 
reveal some interesting findings in this regard. Both years reveal a 
high percentage of senators who voted alike on at least 80 percent of 
all divisive roll-call votes according to SMSA criteria. Of those 
not pairing along SMSA lines in 1965, the senator from District 8 
accounts for 57 percent of the variance in "incorrect" pairing. For 
both years, then, SMSA appears to be a valid and strongly associative 
variable to factional roll-call behavior. Table 6 shows that the 
Democratic minority faction in the Florida Senate consisted primarily 
of "rural" senators. This finding does provide some evidence that 
the basis for the bifactional character of the senate can be 
attributed to an urban-rural cleavage to some extent. On the other 
hand, the data from both Tables 5 and 6 show little evidence of 
regionalism accounting for factionalism in the state. Despite 
northern predominance in the minority faction, the strong percentage 
of southern districts appears to weaken Parson's argument that the 
Florida Senate is divided along a north-south cleavage, especially in
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TABLE 4
BIFACTIONALISM IN THE FLORIDA SENATE AS MEASURED 
BY THE INDEX OF AGREEMENT, 1961, 1965
1961 1965
SMSA Districts 53 62
Non-SMSA Districts 62 60
Northern Districts 63 64
Southern Districts 60 60
All Districts 61 60
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TABLE 5
BIFACTIONALISM IN THE FLORIDA SENATE AS 
MEASURED BY AN 80 BASE INDEX OF 
AGREEMENT, 1961*, 1965**
Year Agreement along Agreement along
Urban-Rural Cleavage North-South Cleavage
1961 79% 74%
1965 69% 47%
*29 total pair combinations 
**53 total pair combinations
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF MINORITY FACTION DIVIDING 
ALONG SMSA AND NORTH-SOUTH 
CRITERIA, 1961, 1965
SMSA Non-SMSA North South
1961 15% 85% 54% 46%
1965 8% 92% 66% 33%
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1961 when there are nearly as many southern senators as there are
northern senators in the minority faction. Also note that the
minority faction does not correspond to the Democratic constituencies
of the southern section of Florida as Parsons predicted they would.
The fact that different districts formed the factional
alignments each year suggests that V. 0. Key's initial hypothesis
concerning political atomization and multifactionalism in Florida
63
may still hold true to some extent. Because Key used gubernatorial
races as the basis for his analysis of multifactionalism, this study
cannot accurately examine his hypothesis. The research presented
here did find the existence of bifactionalism in the Senate, but the
factional elements appear to be based on shifting alliances among
northern and southern districts. In terms of electoral accountability,
bifactionalism is preferred over multifactionalism. According to
Margaret Echols and Austin Ranney,
Multifactional one-partyism makes politics formless and hard for 
the voters to comprehend. It renders elections useless as devices 
for holding leaders effectively to account. It constitutes a 
major deterrent against good people entering politics. And it 
makes government especially susceptible to manipulation by 
pressure groups.^4
Because an urban-rural distinction appears evident with the factions
isolated in this study, electoral accountability may not be as
63V. 0. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Random House,
1949), p. 82.
64Margaret Thompson Echols and Austin Ranney, "The Impact of 
Inter-Party Competition Reconsidered: The Case of Florida," Journal
of Politics, 38 (1976), 144.
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threatened in Florida as these authors would suggest given Key's
conclusions. Havard and Beth note that Florida legislators are
generally responsive to local influences. They write, "Not only is
this concern with local attitudes related to the popular demand for
direct representation, but part of the 'modus operandi' of the two
65
houses themselves is built around this expectation."
To test the hypothesis that factional voting cleavages 
resemble party voting cleavages in terms of national party identifica­
tion, this study will compare the mean ecological variable character­
istics of the minority faction against the mean characteristics of 
the rest of the Senate. If a substantial difference exists which 
makes one group appear Republican-like in relation to the other group, 
then the hypothesis would be confirmed. The figures from Table 7 do 
not confirm the hypothesis as the differences between the characteris-
o
tics of the Democratic faction and the rest of the senate do not 
resemble party differences to any large extent. On the variables 
population per square mile, percent urban, percent foreign stock, 
and number of farms, the faction does appear to take on the character­
is tics of Republican identity, but for the most part, the differences 
between the variables are too small to have any significance. Note 
also the large numerical shift in number of farms within the minority 
faction between 1961 and 1965. Such a shift suggests again that the
f\ S
William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of 
Mis-Representation (Baton-Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University
Press, 1962), pp. 105-106.
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TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
MINORITY FACTION WITH REMAINING SENATORIAL
DISTRICTS IN FLORIDA, 
1961
1961, 1965
1965
Faction Others Faction Others
Number of Farms 935 747 435 833
Income $10,000 and over 
(percent) 7 9 7 10
Income under $3,000 
(percent) 42 33 41 33
Percent White Collar 34 37 36 39
Percent Employed in 
Manufacturing
14 14 12 14
Percent Foreign Stock 7 9 6 11
Percent Negro 23 23 24 19
Percent Urban 40 53 34 57
Population per square mile 39 130 39 148
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faction is not very stable over time.
Given the presence of factional politics in Florida and 
generally competitive party politics in California, this inquiry can 
proceed to test the hypothesis that voting in a partisan-minded senate 
will display similar average correlations with constituency variables 
as voting in an essentially nonpartisan, one-party dominant senate. 
Table 8 shows the correlation coefficients between the calculated 
voting index of each state’s senators and the selected ecological vari­
ables. It can be readily seen that the correlations for California 
are not consistently higher than those for Florida. Although 
California displays higher correlations on six of the issue areas 
in 1961 and on five of the nine issue areas in 1965, the overall 
weakness of the linear relationships compared to the Florida 
correlations indicates that factionalism in Florida may have approxi­
mated the operations of a two-party system. Apparently, partisanship 
in itself, as characterized by a structured organization and formal 
party leadership does not explain the strength of the relationship 
between ecological variables and roll-call behavior. That aspect of 
partisanship, however, relating to inter-party constituency differences 
does appear to correspond to intra-party differences in a factionally 
dominated senate where constituency characteristics are associated 
with voting behavior. The weakness of the correlations in both states, 
however, suggests that the association between ecological variables 
and voting behavior is moderate in a few instances but negligible in 
most. Although it cannot be inferred that the senators are not
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TABLE 8
ASSOCIATION (r) BETWEEN ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND VOTING INDEX IN CALIFORNIA AND 
FLORIDA, 1961, 1965
1961 1965
Florida California Florida California
Number of Farms -. 04* -.27 .04* -.21
Income $10,000 and 
Over (Percent) -.19 -.03* -.05* -.32
Income under $3,000 
(Percent) .02*
.16 -.16 .28
Percent White Collar -.05* -.22 .08 -.15
Percent Employed in 
Manufacturing -.03* -.16 -.11* -.07
Percent Foreign Stock .01* -.28 .28 -.31
Percent Negro .08* -.14 .21 -.31
Percent Urban -.13 -.04* .27 -.11*
Population per Square 
Mile -.41
.20 .22 . 06*
*not statistically significant
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responsive to their constituents’ needs, it is apparent that the 
influence of the selected constituency characteristics on legislative 
voting behavior is quite weak. The best single predictor of roll-call 
.behavior in Florida was population density. Since this variable, 
along with percent urban, appears strongly related to SMSA and 
urban-rural distinctions, it is not surprising that they account for
2
most of the variance (r ). For California, the best predictors are 
percent foreign stock and percent of population with income $10,000 
and over. Surprisingly, in 1966, LeBlanc found these correlations to 
be only -.01 and -.16 respectively.^ Considering the theoretical 
link between party and constituency in partisan states, one would 
expect high correlations between socio-economic variables and roll-call 
voting. Again, the correlations are too weak to infer senatorial 
responsiveness on the basis of perceived ecological traits.
The hypothesis that intra-party voting cleavages will most 
often occur from senators representing districts atypical of their 
party identification proves unconfirmed for Florida, primarily because 
the heterogeneous character of the Democratic Party in Florida 
obfuscates the concept of party identification. Only two senators in 
1965 representing SMSA districts consistently voted with senators 
representing non-SMSA districts. The ecological characteristics of 
their districts were substantially atypical of the other SMSA
66Hugh L. LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and
Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 
(February 1969), 46.
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districts. Table 9 shows the mean figures for the ecological 
variables of the SMSA districts, excluding the "atypical” districts 
one and eight, and the figures for the two atypical districts. The 
•standard deviations are given to show the dispersion of data around 
the means as well as to illustrate the scope of the difference among 
the selected variables.
On the variables population per square mile, percent urban, 
percent Negro, percent white collar, and percent of population with 
income $10,000 and over, the two districts diverge from the mean 
scores beyond one standard deviation. Their ratings on the first two 
variables relating to population density and degree of urbanization 
appear to characterize District 1 and 8 as more rural than urban. In 
the 1965 session of the Florida Senate, some intra-party voting 
cleavages can be explained in terms of senators representing atypical 
districts, but no evidence exists suggesting that voting cleavages 
most often occur from senators representing atypical districts.
A less significant, yet valid test of the hypothesis for the 
1961 session of the senate is to operationally define all urban 
districts as "atypical districts," since 71 percent of the senate 
represented rural districts based on SMSA and percent urban criteria. 
One could, therefore, hypothesize urban legislators to manifest 
generically lower voting indices than their rural colleagues. A mean 
voting index of 73 exists for all roll-call votes across the selected 
issue domains. Of the urban senators' indices, 70 percent fall below 
this average. This means, of course, that the majority of the urban
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TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES OF SMSA 
DISTRICTS WITH TWO ATYPICAL SMSA 
DISTRICTS IN FLORIDA, 1965
Mean District1
District
8
Standard
Deviation
Number of Farms
Income $10,000 and 
Over (Percent)
Income under $3,000 
(Percent)
Percent White Collar
Percent Employed in 
Manufacturing
Percent Foreign Stock
Percent Negro
Percent Urban
Population per Square 
Mile
1,035
11
26
44
13
12
17
83
343
624
7
30
38
23
4
7
14
29
377
14
27
53
7
4
33
65
111
886
2
4 
3 
6
9
5 
14
138
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senators do not vote as frequently with the Democratic majority as do
the rural senators. On this basis, the hypothesis may be partially
confirmed; yet the presence of a minority rural faction, as 
previously indicated, may weaken any such conclusions.
Applying the same methodology to California, it is found 
that the majority of the Republicans represented urban districts 
during the two legislative sessions while Democrats represented 
primarily rural districts. If representatives from atypical districts 
account for most of the intraparty voting cleavages, then rural 
Republicans should display high voting indices and.urban Democrats 
low voting indices in relation to the mean index for each senate 
session. Tables 10 and 11 reveal, with the exception of urban
Democrats in 1965, that the parties satisfy the hypothetical
requirements. This data also appears to confirm the hypothesis that 
representatives from similar constituencies vote alike and in opposi­
tion to representatives from constituencies with contrasting 
characteristics. The urban and rural cleavages in the Florida Senate, 
with their corresponding voting alignments, also confirm the 
hypothesis that different constituencies result in different voting 
patterns. This does not, however, apply to all the voting patterns 
found in the senate. As was mentioned earlier, many alignments may 
be temporarily made on the basis of committee membership, pressure 
group influences, executive requests, and so forth, all independent 
of constituency considerations.
TABLE 10
PERCENT RURAL REPUBLICANS WITH VOTING INDEX 
ABOVE THE MEAN INDEX,* 1961, 1965
1961 80%
1965 100%
"k
1961 mean index = 75
1965 mean index = 73
TABLE 11
PERCENT URBAN DEMOCRATS WITH VOTING INDEX 
BELOW THE MEAN INDEX,* 1961, 1965
1961 54%
1965 40%
1961 mean index = 78 
1965 mean index = 85
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Legislative behavior in the Florida and California senates 
appears to reflect each dimension of role theory in varying degrees. 
Representatives may likely assume different role orientations as 
demands upon them change over time. These orientations naturally 
correspond to the relative impact constituency variables have on 
representatives’ voting behavior. In Florida, members of the minority 
faction appear to resemble instructed delegates more than party 
loyalists, while the majority faction, with its more dispersed voting 
patterns, resembles politicos or trustees more than instructed 
delegates. Party voting exists in California, but is weak enough on 
some issues to suggest delegate or trustee-type behavior on the part 
of many senators. Regardless of the role orientations the legislators 
may or may not assume, it is apparent from the correlations that 
either their perceptions of constituency attitudes are not based on 
ecological characteristics or that they are generally unresponsive to 
their constituents on the selected issues. This conclusion is not 
surprising for the Florida Senate despite the presence of a small, but 
cohesive minority faction. Susan Welch finds that in the absence of 
party leadership and organization, voting in a nonpartisan legislature 
is high unstructured, and party and constituency influences appear to
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be insufficient cues for the organization of legislative voting 
67behavior. Although the presence of a limited urban-rural cleavage
in Florida does introduce some structure into the voting alignments,
it does not manifest distinctive and pervasive voting patterns. This
behavior appears to be applicable to the Federal level as well.
Jewell and Patterson note that several studies of the United States
House of Representatives reveal that the voting behavior of urban
congressmen differs from that of rural congressmen, but the differences
68are not major and seem to vary with the issues. There is emerging
evidence that the Florida Senate will gradually, if it has not
already, display increasingly greater party organization and structure.
The maturing of the Republican Party into a viable political force in
Florida was the outstanding development in Florida politics in the
1960-1970 decade. Hartsfield and Roady state that the ability of the
Republicans to win strongly contested elections on a state-wide basis
is now a fact, and that the increasing strength of the Republicans, as
shown on the voter registration books, is a further manifestation of
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two-party development in Florida. Given the ecological heterogeneity
^Susan Welch, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in 
a Non-Partisan Legislature," American Political Science Review, 67 
(September 1973), 855.
68
Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative 
Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966),
pp. 434-435.
69
A. M. Hartsfield and E. E. Roady, Florida Votes, 1920-1970 
(Tallahassee, Florida: Florida State University, Institute for Social
Research, 1972), p. 41.
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of the Democratic Party, however, it is unlikely that party voting 
will come to reflect constituency differences as premised in the 
responsible-party model of representation.
Summarizing the findings of this research regarding the 
testing of the initial hypotheses results in the following 
confirmations:
1. Voting in a partisan-minded senate will display 
similar average correlations with constituency variables as voting 
in an essentially nonpartisan, one-party dominant senate.
2. Legislators from similar constituencies will vote 
together and in opposition to legislators from constituencies with 
contrasting ecological characteristics.
The hypotheses which were examined and proved unconfirmed by 
the findings of this study are:
1. Factional voting cleavages will resemble party voting 
cleavages on certain issues associated with national party identifi­
cations .
2. The voting alignment of the Florida Senate will 
parallel to a significant degree a sectional alignment of the 
constituencies. The majority faction will correspond to the strong 
Democratic districts of north Florida, while the minority faction 
will correspond to the Democratic constituencies of south Florida.
The hypothesis that intra-party voting cleavages will most 
often occur among senators representing districts atypical of their 
party identification proved unconfirmed for Florida but confirmed for
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California on the basis of SMSA criteria. In one-party states exhibit­
ing factional politics wherein party identity is vague, it is difficult 
to define what constitutes typical or atypical districts. However, 
.even when considering all Florida senatorial districts with Republican­
like constituency characteristics as "atypical,” the hypothesis 
remained unconfirmed.
An ancillary hypothesis that was tested with regard to 
Florida proposed the presence of an urban-rural cleavage in the 
Senate which would provide the basis for the factional alignments. 
Although the Senate was not significantly divided along urban-rural 
lines, the minority faction did appear to be characterized by a rural 
distinction which consistently voted in opposition to most urban and 
a few rural majority faction members.
On the basis of this inquiry, it is apparent that partisanship, 
as described in terms of party leadership and formal organization, 
does not explain the strength of the relationship between ecological 
variables and roll-call votes. That aspect of partisanship, however, 
relating to the correspondence between party identity and consti­
tuency characteristics appears to provide a more accurate explanation 
of partisanship influence on voting behavior. In this respect, the 
marginal differences between the correlation coefficients of Florida 
and California can be understood. The minority faction in the Florida 
Senate serves the same function as an opposition party based on 
constituency characteristics, despite the absence of formal structure 
and leadership.
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To place the foregoing in the context of the initial premise 
which prompted this study, it is probably true that electoral account­
ability is encouraged when party and constituency are interlocking 
variables affecting roll-call votes, with responsible political 
parties as the consequence. However, in the absence of an effective 
two-party system, bifactionalism may serve as a surrogate for 
partisanship and realistically contribute to electoral accountability, 
even if only to a lesser extent. The size of the opposing factions 
greatly influences the degree to which a state's politics will 
approximate a two-party system. The fact that Florida's minority 
faction constitutes less than a third of the total Senate may account 
for the generally weak association of ecological variables to roll-call 
votes in that state. The majority faction need not be consistent in 
its opposition to the numerically weaker minority and much logrolling 
may occur. The weak correlations for the California Senate can only 
be explained in terms of obscure links between constituency and party, 
despite evidence of fairly strong partisanship on certain issues. A 
plausible alternative explanation would be that the selected 
ecological variables are not perceived as salient indicators of 
constituency needs and values. The association of the aggregate eco­
logical characteristics to voting behavior is evident; yet the 
weakness of the association suggests a need for further empirical 
analysis utilizing, perhaps, different independent variables and 
other state legislatures.
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